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1. ABSTRACT 
The mapping of environmental data is rapidly 
expanding as advocates and scholars offer various 
platforms to display and analyze geographic 
environmental information. This working paper 
describes an online web map that displays national 
data from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), 
Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESRI) 
ArcGIS Server platform, the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) Risk Screening Environmental 
Indicators (RSEI), and methodologies from Kraft, 
Stephan, and Abel (2011) to spatially display the 
environmental performance of more than 17,000 
manufacturing facilities.  
www.wwu.edu/huxley/spatial/maps/tri 
The web map is supported by an online database 
and provides its audience with the ability to visualize 
facility performance over time, to individually search 
addresses, and display a toxic release inventory of a 
spatial selection for different years. TRI facilities are 
depicted as circles with colors that correlate to a 
rating system that can be accessed through the map 
key. Smaller circles indicate fewer pounds released; 
larger circles indicate more pounds released. Lighter 
circles represent polluters who are posing less risk to 
their neighbors. Users are also able to access an 
attribute table containing the facility name, parent 
company, location, identification number, pounds of 
toxics produced, and finally their RSEI relative risk 
score.   
The use of color and size contrasts presents the 
EPA data in a way that is more accessible to an 
audience that may not be familiar with TRI data. 
Moreover, a time scale function allows viewers to 
perform a trend analysis between the years 1996 and 
2007. The change of colors and sizes reflect 
increases or decreases in performance so the viewer 
will be able to see if a certain facility has been getting 
better or worse over time, or, if their neighboring 
industrial plants are getting safer and cleaner. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty five years ago, Congress passed the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act (EPRCA) that required thousands of industrial 
facilities to reveal what toxic chemicals they 
manufactured, used in their operations, and then 
disposed into the environment. This 1986 legislation 
came two years after the world’s worst industrial 
accident in Bhopal, India.  Hundreds of thousands of 
nearby residents were exposed to the highly toxic 
chemical methyl isocyanate when a Union Carbide 
pesticide manufacturing plant experienced a massive 
leak. 
The poisonous plume killed over 3,000 people on 
the night of December 2, 1984 while harming a 
100,000 more. Many estimates put the Bhopal 
disaster’s death toll over the following month at 
15,000 while it is widely described as affecting more 
than 500,000 people. The disaster’s aftermath lingers 
decades later with hundreds of tons of hazardous 
waste remaining at the site, high levels of pesticide 
residues in neighborhood wells, and a variety of 
chronic health problems linked to the plant’s toxic 
emissions (Crabb 2004; Sengupta 2008).    
People around the world were shocked by the 
Bhopal disaster and alarmed that industrial facilities 
could pose such risks to nearby communities and 
their residents. Chemical industry advocates told the 
U.S. Congress that the risk of a Bhopal disaster was 
very low. Yet one year later at factory in the town of 
Institute, West Virginia, a similar but smaller leak 
occurred.   
In 1989, a report to EPA identified seventeen 
Bhopal-level disasters over the previous 25 years with 
releases in volume and toxicity equal to or exceeding 
the 1984 disaster.  Between 1982 and 1989, 
according to the report, 11,048 U.S. toxic chemical 
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accidents resulted in 11,341 injuries and 309 deaths 
(Shebecoff 1989).  
2.1. RIGHT-TO-KNOW 
In the decade before the Bhopal and Institute 
West Virginia disasters, a push had begun for 
chemical right-to-know laws and by 1980, 
Connecticut, New York, Michigan, Maine, and 
California had enacted information disclosure 
requirements on industry to give workers -- and 
sometimes communities -- access to chemical 
releases at local manufacturing facilities. Philadelphia 
adopted one of the first right-to-know laws in 1981 
followed by several cities in California and Cincinnati 
in 1982. Seventeen states and sixteen municipalities 
had similar laws by 1984 and by mid-1985, twenty-
eight states had them (Hadden 1989; Kriz 1988). The 
push for the right-to-know about environmental 
pollution and other hazards was shaped as well by 
broader social forces changing the public 
expectations for business and governmental decision 
making (Eisner, Worsham, and Ringquist 2006; 
Hamilton 2005; Harris and Milkis 1996).  
Within three months of the Bhopal disaster, 
several Congressional bills merged into the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) of 1984, with its new Title III, the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
(EPCRA), and the new Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI) program.  As one observer put it, “The Bhopal 
train was leaving the station, and we got the kind of 
legislation we could put on the train” (Kriz 1988, 
3008). Unable to ignore the right-to-know momentum, 
President Reagan signed SARA in 1986.  The next 
year, EPCRA authorized the EPA to begin requiring 
companies to report the release and transfer of toxic 
waste from a list of priority chemicals that posed risks 
of acute human toxicity, chronic human toxicity, and 
environmental toxicity “. . . at concentration levels that 
are reasonably likely to exist beyond facility site 
boundaries as a result of continuous, or frequently 
recurring, releases” (EPCRA 1986). 
Over the years, the EPA has added new 
chemicals to an original list of 300, bringing the total 
registry to more than 650 pollutants. The normative 
argument for information disclosure policies like the 
TRI is rooted in ideas about the public’s right to 
access certain information and the government’s 
responsibility to ensure the information is available so 
that citizens can make sensible choices. In fact, the 
MAP 1. TRI FACILITIES IN 2007 NEAR INSTITUTE, WV. 
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A third way of environmental governance 
would become a critical response to 
administrative rationalism and the concentration 
of environmental policy power at the national 
level or in subnational government agencies. 
lack of sufficient information to foster competition or to 
allow consumers to make appropriate choices 
represents a classic 
market failure. 
Requirements for 
information disclosure 
also may be seen as 
essential to justice in a 
democratic society which 
requires that people be 
aware of the potential harms to their personal 
security, including their health and well-being (Stern 
and Fineberg 1996). 
The public’s right-to-know in our representative 
democracy can be traced to concepts in the nation’s 
founding ideals that average citizens are entitled to 
know what their elected leaders are doing on their 
behalf. Later, and at the same time that the nation’s 
major environmental policies were being created, 
public expectations grew not only for a more open and 
accountable government (Gormley and Balla 2008; 
Williams and Matheny 1995), but also for any 
information that a particular organization or economic 
sector might have a moral responsibility to share. 
Information disclosure, as a form of public policy, also 
can be understood to be what Schneider and Ingram 
(1997) called a capacity-building tool. By informing or 
enlightening people, it acts as a partial step towards 
empowering people to act through democratic 
processes. 
TRI’s moment in the history of environmental 
policy’s evolution came near the end of two decades 
of institutional and political development. The first 
decade, or “epoch” of regulatory policy (Mazmanian 
and Kraft 1999) involved the establishment of 
environmental policy as a national priority in the U.S. 
and a series of “command-and-control” regulations 
(Marcus 1980, Melnick 1983, Reagen 1987). Some of 
the main features included a focus on human health 
and margin-of-safety analysis, technology forcing 
standards to control end-of-the-pipe pollution, and 
centralized federalism. Or, as one recent appraisal 
put it, the initial 
environmental regulations 
were widely viewed as 
“heavily bureaucratic, 
prescriptive, fragmented in 
purpose, and adversarial in 
nature” (Durant, Fiorino, and 
O’Leary, 2004, 1). However, 
a decade of experience within this system and the 
emergence of new issues led to growing pressures for 
change (Vig and Kraft 1984).  
A second epoch saw many developments 
towards the emphasis of either economic or risk 
analysis (NRC 1983; Russell & Gruber 1987; Smith 
1984; Swartzman Liroff & Croke 1982). One of the 
notable institutional challenges faced by management 
at the EPA was its lack of an organic act and multiple 
laws pulling the agency in many directions. Moreover, 
vague and even conflicting legislative language 
resulted in multiple definitions of acceptable risks and 
different considerations of costs and benefits.  These 
ambiguities spurred efforts in the executive branch to 
establish control over a seemingly irrational regulatory 
system.   
In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive 
Order 12291 that required the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(CBA) of all regulations expected to have an annual 
economic impact of at least 10 million dollars, raise 
prices, or adversely affect competitiveness (Reagan 
1981). Three years later, the EPA administrator 
declared that risk assessment and risk management 
would become a primary decision making framework 
for the agency (EPA 1984). Both economic and risk 
assessment were attempts to bring a common 
denominator to decision making in a fragmented and 
adversarial environmental policy regime.   
However, below this current of technocratic and 
rationalizing policy reforms, crosscurrents of 
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democratic impulses were swirling. “Beginning in the 
1980s,” according to Sirianni and Friedland (1995), 
“more participatory alternatives to top-down 
environmental regulation and the public lobby model 
of formal citizen participation . . . started to emerge in 
the United States” (5). The TRI’s arrival in 1987 
helped amplify this democratic turn away from the 
centralized and commanding or the technocratic and 
rationalizing ways of the EPA. A third way of 
environmental governance would become a critical 
response to administrative rationalism and the 
concentration of environmental policy power at the 
national level or in subnational government agencies. 
The resisting discourse echoed a communitarian tone 
and emanated from the local level. “Communitarian 
thought suggests ... a common public interest can be 
discovered if an enlightened citizenry governs directly 
in its own behalf” (Williams and Matheny 1995, 27). 
Dissatisfaction with the centralization of power led to 
the emergence of hundreds of locally led 
environmental initiatives. Several researchers call this 
approach civic environmentalism (John 1994; 
Knopman, Susman, & Landy 1999; Shutkin 2000; 
Sirianni & Friedland 2001).  
These democratic environmental impulses 
strengthened across states and localities during the 
nineties—environmental policy’s third epoch. In this 
period, John (1993) asserted that policy 
developments were progressing more in the states 
and communities than at the national level.  He noted 
a doubling of state expenditures in natural resource 
and environmental programs since 1986 and how 
cases of innovation in pollution prevention, ecosystem 
protection, and energy conservation emerged in the 
states. This new environmental federalism also 
stimulated the attention of both scholars and 
practitioners (Adler 1998; Anderson & Hill 1997; 
NAPA 1995). In addition to the devolution of policy-
making responsibility from the federal government to 
state and local jurisdictions, there also have been 
expositions on attempts to increase the influence of 
citizens in environmental decisions (Abel and Stephan 
2000; Layzer 2002).   
At the end of the Clinton presidency, the civic 
environmental impulse briefly ascended to national 
prominence when the EPA (2000) released a draft 
public involvement policy aiming to enhance early and 
meaningful public participation and techniques to 
foster it in environmental decision making.  Expanding 
environmental decision making involvement even 
received support at the beginning of the Bush 
administration. New EPA administrator Christine Todd 
Whitman (2001) proclaimed that the agency would “. . 
. launch a new era of cooperation among all 
stakeholders in environmental protection.”  She would 
also describe another policy priority: “We will use 
strong science. Scientific analysis should drive 
policy.”  Thus, U.S. environmental policy in the 1990s 
seemed to simultaneously emphasize more public 
access in decision making and scientific analysis.  
“But,” as Abel and Stephan (2008) asked, “do these 
concurrent means—participation of citizens and use of 
technical expertise—amount to an irreconcilable 
tradeoff” (152)? Or, as Foreman (1998) put it, 
“Perhaps the most interesting and important question 
facing environmental scholars and policymakers as 
we approach the new century is how, if at all, we 
might achieve a more satisfying and durable blend of 
the technical and democratic demands that weigh so 
heavily on environmental policy making” (59). 
Numerous researchers (Cline & Lamb 2005; 
Press 1994; White & Hall 2006) have applied a great 
deal of attention to this very tension, or what some 
called a “technical information quandary” (Pierce and 
Lovrich 1986). Likewise, a rationalizing and 
democratizing dissonance also echoed across the 
field of geography during the 1990s as the technology 
of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) accelerated 
in use.  
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2.2. DEMOCRATIC GIS 
In the fall of 1993, a debate between human 
geographers and geographic information scientists 
became the focus of meetings held in Friday Harbor, 
Washington. These meetings became widely known 
as the beginning of the geography field’s discussion 
over GIS and Society (Gatrell 1997; Nyerges, 
McMaster & Couclelis 2011; Pickles 2006; Sheppard 
et al. 1999). The beginning exchanges between 
human geographers and their GIS counterparts 
involved debates around the field’s future emphasis 
between the technical or social. This debate, and the 
one in environmental policy discussed above, could 
be seen, as Schuurman (2000) observed, “. . . part of 
a broader negotiation over the value and meaning of 
science and technology and their relationship to the 
culture in which they are embedded” (571).   
In one summary (Jordan et al. 2011), the 
democratizing turn in geography involves an array of 
shifts (See Table 1 above). Defined as Public 
Participation Geographic Information Systems 
(PPGIS) by one (Sieber 2006), participatory GIS 
(Elwood 2006) by another, and community-orientated 
GIS (Harris & Weiner 1998) by a third perspective; 
geographers faced a similar “democracy-technocracy 
quandary” (Steel 2000) as their counterparts in 
environmental science and policy. In particular, 
cartographers faced a challenge of doing maps with 
increasingly sophisticated GIS tools while 
simultaneously increasing transparency for, and 
participation by the public. On the one hand, tools like 
Google Earth, Wikimapia, and OpenStreetMap can be 
used by amateurs to produce and distribute maps that 
address community concerns like environmental 
injustice (Maantay 2002).  On the other hand, “Much 
Table 1. Terminology for the Democratization of Cartography 
Cartography 2.0 Digital map design, collaboration, and access via the Web. 
Citizen sensors Spatial data collection enhanced by non-expert collaborators.   
Mashup Web-based mapping applications that mix data from two or more sources and 
facilitates cartographic visualization and communication. 
Metadata Data about geographic data such as descriptions about what the data 
represent, how the data was collected, who collected and distributed the data, 
the data’s timestamp, and information to display the data in a coordinate system 
and projection. 
Neogeography The growth of non-expert geography applications, techniques, and data made 
available via the Web. 
Open source Software designed and developed to be freely distributed and customized by 
new users. 
Web 2.0 Web design that enhances online data exchange, collaboration, and more 
equitable levels of access and participation. 
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of Web 2.0 is without formal metadata, or 
documentation about the data. Metadata should 
document the accuracy, authorship, and timestamp of 
the geospatial data” (Jordan et al. 2011, 158).  
For instance, Goodchild has described several 
errors in Google Earth (Goodchild 2007; Schuurman 
2009). Rather than take sides, several researchers 
instead advocate an amateur-expert alliance in efforts 
where GIS becomes a mediating tool for the multi-
disciplinary sharing of data, knowledge, and expertise 
(Jordan et al. 2011; Joyce 2009). We share this 
perspective and designed this web mapping tool in 
the spirit of blending rationalizing and democratizing 
elements that represents a kind of “civic” cartography. 
We also hope that our geospatial design will help 
address another challenge for toxic disclosure 
programs: the dilemma of fostering industrial 
environmental performance. 
3. INDUSTRIAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE AND 
INFORMATION USE 
In what has become a rite of spring for 
environmental journalism, the United State 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) each year 
publishes a report of the latest data from the Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI). The TRI is EPA’s most well-
known information disclosure program. As the data 
are made available, one sees a flurry of media reports 
that disseminate to the wider public some basic 
information about the nature of toxics releases. In one 
of the earliest release dates for the TRI program, the 
EPA published the 2010 national analysis on January 
5, 2012. For the first time in history, the TRI recorded 
a double digit increase in emissions, or 16 percent 
more pollution than the previous year. This increase 
occurred despite a drop in reporting facilities of two 
percent. In Massachusetts, 441 TRI facilities reported 
a drop of 1.12 million pounds since 2009 in an 
analysis by the Fitchburg city paper, the Sentinel & 
Enterprise. But in Maine, industry reported a 13 
percent increase in pollution or 1.1 million pounds 
more than the year before (Miller 2012).  
What often gets overlooked in the reporting of 
national summary data is that states and even 
facilities can vary widely in their changes from year to 
year. In fact, the fundamental idea behind the TRI is 
that requiring facilities to submit annual reports of 
their toxic release into the environment will stimulate 
efforts by companies to substantially reduce their 
pollution. A kind of “shock-or-shame” theory is 
fundamental to this presumption where one of two 
things may happen (Stephan 2002). On the one hand, 
citizens or other political actors may act to pressure 
the pollution output of industry when new information 
shocks them and reinforces concerns or fears about 
the risk of exposure to pollutants. On the other hand, 
companies may improve their environmental 
performance because they worry about the negative 
attention they may receive due to being listed as a 
bad performer. However, the nature of the information 
is critical.  
If information is new and surprising, then citizens 
or political actors may be motivated to participate in 
environmental politics or policy. Once the information 
loses its newness in these cases, theory suggests 
that political actors would be less likely to be 
influenced by the continued provision of information.  
One might expect that a steady stream of information 
would desensitize political actors, unless there were 
dramatic changes in the data that suggested the need 
for increased attention. In fact, the structure of TRI 
data is essentially unchanged from the program’s 
inception twenty-five years ago. As Kraft, Stephan, 
and Abel (2011) concluded, “. . . it is clear that the 
kind of information the TRI provides would be more 
useful to facility managers, public officials, and 
citizens if it could be presented in ways that better 
clarify relative public health risks and are more easily 
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understood, particularly for nonprofessionals at the 
community level” (186). In that vein, these 
researchers suggested a framework for illuminating 
the environmental performance of facilities over time. 
Providing the data by facility in pounds of releases 
has become a less meaningful metric to most citizens.  
 Since its inception, the TRI’s skeptics have 
criticized its self-reported nature and many other 
problems with the information disclosed in the 
inventory. For instance, annual public releases until 
2012 have lacked any risk characterizations that 
would allow a comparison of various toxic releases or 
the relative hazard of different facilities.  In fact, EPA 
documentation on using the TRI begins by telling 
potential users that the database’s chemicals can 
vary widely in their toxic effects. One’s perception of 
and attention to high-volume releases may be 
misdirected when more toxic chemicals are being 
released at lower volumes (U.S. EPA 2002b). We 
avoided this limitation by utilizing the EPA’s Risk 
Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) software 
program version 2.3.0 to characterize the relative risk 
of TRI facilities by air emissions. Moreover, Abel, 
Stephan and Kraft (2007), consider facility by facility 
changes in risk over time as one dimension of 
environmental performance. The second dimension 
captures the direction of a facility’s performance by its 
change in release volume.  
Together, changes in risk and releases were used 
to fashion a 2 x 2 matrix with directional increases and 
decreases coinciding or diverging into four kinds of 
industrial environmental performance in toxic pollution 
trends. When both releases and risk levels decrease; 
a facility becomes safer and cleaner and could be 
classified with a greening performance. In a second 
category of performance were blue facilities who 
reduced risk but increased release volumes (i.e., 
safer but dirtier). Yellow facilities populated a third 
category of performance by decreasing release levels 
to get cleaner but increasing their relative risk. In the 
fourth category of performance, brown facilities 
became riskier and dirtier. Table 2 replicates the 
environmental performance characterizations for 
industrial facilities from Abel, Stephan, and Kraft 
(2007) for 1991-1995 using the latest version of RSEI 
(3.2.0) and adds data from 1996, 2000, and 2007.  
Between 1991 and 1995, facilities decreasing 
releases outnumbered those increasing pollution 
levels by eight percent (54 to 46 percent respectively) 
while a nearly equal number of facilities decreased 
risk as those that increased risk (Table 2 above). 
These results suggest that the TRI program is 
perhaps not as successful as many have assumed it 
to be. Green facilities outnumbered brown facilities by 
only four percent. The remaining 20 percent of 
facilities fall into the interesting hybrid categories 
where release and risk performance move in opposite 
directions. As described in earlier work (Kraft et al. 
2011): 
The “. . . achievements and benefits of the TRI 
program are by no means uniform. They vary 
considerably across industrial sectors, states, 
communities, and individual facilities. . . The EPA and 
independent analysts have focused on the aggregate 
trends across all manufacturing industries, a practice 
that tends to give a misleading picture of how facilities 
are performing” (182).  
For instance, the yellow category of our 
performance characterization demonstrates how 
substantial decreases in overall emissions can occur 
at the same time that facilities are increasing risk. Any 
new TRI presentation must help viewers take this 
variation into account and our mapping tool provides 
one kind of approach to display facility by facility 
performance trajectories. Above, two tables display 
the environmental performance of those facilities 
reporting in 1996, 2000, and 2001. We also omitted 
facilities in the bottom deciles of both risk and release 
to concentrate on the more significant producers of 
toxic pollution. From 1996 to 2000, the gaps among 
different levels of aggregate facility performance 
widened. 
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Table 2. Industrial environmental performance for TRI facilities. 
Adapted from Abel, Stephan, & Kraft (2007). 
1996 - 2000 
2001 - 2007 
1991 - 1995 
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The percentage of facilities in the five years 
between 1996 and 2000 getting dirtier and riskier 
(Brown TRIs) dropped by eight percent while greening 
facilities increased by four percent. Therefore, the gap 
between facilities in the different release performance 
categories increased to 16 percent; a fourfold 
increase from the first five years considered by Abel, 
Stephan, and Kraft (2007). 
The most dramatic shift is discernible on releases 
alone, or the column totals. The difference between 
facilities reducing versus increasing releases in this 
second time period was 24 percent (Table 2 above). 
Conversely, there was only an eight percent gap 
between facilities getting safer and those getting 
riskier. In the next seven years, the gaps changed far 
less dramatically; 26 percent between release 
reducers and increasers and 13 percent between risk 
reducers and increasers. These results beg this 
question: Why such a divergence between pollution 
volume performance and risk reductions? We 
speculate that the greater progress in release 
reductions are a function of what Fiorino (2004) 
described as the “compliance imperative.” Since 
facilities are required to report their releases and their 
volumes are disseminated annually in EPA 
documents and websites, environmental managers 
focus on improving the publicly disclosed information. 
The business adage, “You manage what you 
measure,” would apply. But more broadly, these 
results also are consistent with Kraft, Stephan, and 
Abel’s (2011) “performance dilemma” described next. 
3.1. ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
DILEMMAS 
Table three below lays out a simple heuristic that 
we use to better understand the dilemma that facilities 
and governments (federal or state) face in the area of 
industrial pollution management. The heuristic is 
grounded in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rapoport 
and Chammah 1965), filtered through the subsequent 
work of Scholz’s (1991) “enforcement” dilemma and 
Potoski and Prakash’s (2004) “regulation” dilemma.  
Governments have two basic choices (though one 
can think of these on a continuum as well): focus on 
compliance or encourage facilities to go beyond 
simple compliance.  
In much the same way, facilities can either meet 
the letter of the law or work to go beyond minimal 
requirements. Simply put, without outside pressures 
to change the payoff structure, the equilibrium 
position leads to less preferred outcome. The first 
number in each box represents the payoff for 
government and the second number represents the 
payoff for the facility. The payoffs are consistent with 
standard restrictions placed upon prisoner’s dilemmas 
(Scholz 1991, 118).  
No matter which approach government chooses, 
facilities are better off complying: b > f and d > h. 
Likewise, regardless of facility behavior, government 
is always better off commanding: c > a and g > e.  To 
break out, regulators need to offer facilities benefits 
for superior environmental performance. One step is 
the creation of a mapping tool that allows users to 
view facility performance over time as we describe 
below.  
Annual reports on volume and national or even 
state trends fall short. The performance dilemma 
implies that government and facilities will stick with 
the status quo of command-and-control rather than 
pushing beyond compliance. Our belief is that our 
mapping tool, which also includes risk performance, 
could serve to motivate the policy actors to reach for 
performance synergy. Progress towards the greening 
of industry is much more likely when the focus is on 
the ceiling of performance rather than the floor. 
The performance dilemma serves as a valuable 
heuristic but oversimplifies what theory would predict 
about the influence of multiple factors (including 
information disclosure policies). 
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Governments and facilities are enmeshed in a 
network that includes legislatures, interest groups, 
and citizens. The performance dilemma occurs within 
the context of a series of principal-agent games (see 
Scholz (1991) for his argument about “enforcement 
dilemmas”).  In the real world facilities will appear in 
any of the four boxes in the table. As Kraft, Abel, and 
Stephan (2011) observe in their book: 
“In cases where governments focus on 
encouraging facilities, but facilities focus solely on 
compliance, the actions of governments can be seen 
as weakly cheering on facility behavior while facilities 
themselves do just enough to meet legal 
requirements. When both governments and facilities 
focus on minimal standards, performance itself does 
not exceed threshold expectations. Facilities that 
reach beyond compliance without governmental 
encouragement may get a pat on the back, but no 
other credit is forthcoming. Finally, when both 
governments and facilities focus on increasing 
performance, the rules and regulations set only a 
baseline to strongly surpass” (47). 
However, as Table 2 and 3 demonstrate, the 
dilemma is not inevitably tragic. Many facilities get 
safer and cleaner but risk performance lags behind 
volume performance. Why? We hypothesize that 
because the TRI has traditionally disclosed only 
volume information, facilities have acted accordingly. 
They reduce what’s reported or “manage what is 
measured.” Therefore, we have produced a 
geospatial tool that allows viewers to see not only the 
relative size of a facility’s pollution emissions, but also 
a color representation of their relative risk.  
4. DATA AND METHODS 
We developed a cartographic system that allows 
viewers to quickly see clusters of facilities creating 
higher risk and volume where limited monitoring, 
inspection, and pollution prevention resources could 
be directed. We also joined the few studies (Abel 
2008, Abel and White 2011, Ash and Fetter 2004, 
Downey 2007, Sadd et al. 2011, Shapiro 2005; 
Sicotte and Swanson 2007) that utilized a new 
exposure risk-characterization model developed by 
EPA’s Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics 
(OPPT). The Risk Screening Environmental Indicators 
(RSEI) tool contains records of multiple chemical 
releases from TRI facilities. The model accounts for 
local meteorology and simulates a facility’ toxic air 
release dispersion and concentrations to produce a 
Table 3. Environmental Performance Dilemmas. 
Adapted from Kraft, Stephan, & Abel (2011). 
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comparative risk characterization of different air 
pollution sources (Schmidt 2003). 
RSEI uses reported toxic chemical release 
volumes from each TRI facility as inputs into a steady-
state Gaussian plume model. It then simulates 
downwind air pollutant concentrations from a stack or 
fugitive source as a function of facility-specific 
parameters (stack height, exit gas velocity), local 
meteorology, and chemical-specific dispersion and 
decay rates. These factors are then overlaid on 
demographic data taken from the U.S. Census to 
produce a surrogate dose estimate for the 
surrounding population. The final product of applying 
the RSEI model is an indicator value that represents a 
risk characterization where users can discern and 
compare the relative hazard being produced by 
different facilities. 
A facility is classified as a TRI source if it 
conducts manufacturing operations within Standard 
Industrial Classification codes 20 through 39 (with a 
broader set of categories applicable after 1998, such 
as metal mining, coal mining, and electric utilities that 
burn coal); has ten or more full-time employees; and 
manufactures or processes more than 25,000 pounds 
or otherwise uses more than 10,000 pounds of any 
listed chemical during the year. TRI facilities are 
required to report annually to the EPA their annual 
toxic waste emissions into surface waters, air, land, 
and underground injection wells at their site or 
transferred off-site to landfills and wastewater 
treatment plants. Moreover, TRI facilities must also 
report if they treat, recycle, or burn toxic wastes for 
energy. For 2000, the TRI was expanded to include 
new persistent bioaccumulative toxic (PBT) 
chemicals, with lower reporting thresholds. The full 
TRI list now includes over 650 chemicals. 
To facilitate the use of TRI data in our geospatial 
mapping tool, we transferred data from RSEI’s 
Borland database format into our enterprise level 
PostgreSQL database server (8.4). In PostgreSQL, 
RSEI calculations for relative risk based on the 
following formula were recreated for all facilities in the 
database. The decile for total pounds of toxics 
released and the decile for total risk score were 
calculated and inserted into new fields. 
ESRI ArcSDE (10.0) server technology was 
installed on top of the PostgreSQL server to provide 
an interface between the RSEI data and the ESRI 
ArcGIS Server (10.0) mapping capabilities. ArcGIS 
Server was used to create REST service endpoints 
allowing web apps to access all of the RSEI data.  A 
separate service was created for each year between 
1996 and 2007. The ArcGIS API for Javascript was 
used to create an interactive map using our REST 
endpoints to access and display the RSEI data.  The 
latitude and longitude included in the RSEI data was 
used to place facilities on the map. The decile for total 
pounds released by a facility was used to drive the 
size of the symbol using the equation X^1.8 * n/20+2, 
where X is the pounds released decile and n is the 
zoom level.  Symbol color was assigned using the 
RSEI risk score decile.  Four colors were used to 
represent the first eight deciles, with each color being 
used for two consecutive deciles.  The 9th and 10th 
deciles were each assigned their own color. 
A cache was built for each layer year to reduce 
server load and reduce the amount of time the client’s 
web browser needs to render the map.  This 
eliminates the problem of trying to render over 17,000 
facilities when zoomed out at the full extent.  Instead, 
the cache is a series of pre-rendered tiled png 
images.  To minimize the size of the cache, and to 
reduce the amount of time needed to generate the 
cache, tiles were only built for areas that have 
facilities. We also incorporated a time slider in the 
map interface. Changing the year on the time slider 
changes the cached layer displayed on the map, so 
that only data from facilities in the year selected are 
shown. 
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A search function was added that queries the rest 
service for all years of data.  The search returns a list 
of facilities where the query matched all or part of the 
facility name, parent company name, federal agency 
name, facility id, or any part of the facility address.  
Clicking on one of the facilities returned by the search 
result zooms the map to that facility. Clicking on a 
facility on the map returns attribute information about 
that facility, including the facilities name, parent 
company, address, total pounds released, risk score, 
and the direction of that facilities performance over 
time. 
5. Demonstration 
In the following pages, we provide two 
screenshots from our web map to demonstrate the 
utility of a longitudinal performance view. Each page 
displays TRI locations along with representations of 
each facility’s pollution volume (circle size) and risk 
(color). Following Abel (2007), we also focus on the 
metropolitan St. Louis region. St. Louis has been a 
major industrial hub for more than a century because 
of its mid-continental location and Mississippi river 
ports. In the first landscape image below, a 1996 
screenshot captured more than 100 TRI facilities. In 
the 2007 display, less than 90 TRI facilities appear. 
This longitudinal comparison demonstrates several 
features of our performance mapping approach. 
For instance, an attentive viewer could discern 
how the south central part of the city loses several 
medium sized volume and risk producers while in the 
north – south corridor east of the Mississippi, several 
large volume and risky facilities remain. In the 
southwest part of the map, several small risk and 
volume producers disappear from an industrial cluster 
but several big producers remain. Moreover, viewers 
would also benefit from quickly seeing what facilities 
display little to no change over a decade. For 
instance, several facilities in the southeast part of the 
map appear to improve their environmental 
performance while others have no perceptible change 
in risk or volume. Those facilities also remain a more 
concentrated risk cluster near East St. Louis, an area 
that has raised environmental injustice concerns 
before.  
According to the 2010 census, this city of 27,006 
people was 98% African-American with 41% of 
households below the poverty level and 18.2% 
unemployment. In 2008, Abel’s study of the St. Louis 
riskscape found that: “one-fifth of the region’s air 
pollution exposure risk . . . was concentrated among 
only six facilities on the southwest border of East St. 
Louis” (232). He also observed that the dominant 
statistical methods found in two decades of scholarly 
publications on environmental justice relied on the 
statistics of averages that were blind to these extreme 
concentrations of risk and social vulnerability.  
Also, the cartography that accompanied some of 
the most cited environmental justice studies depicted 
industrial pollution risks with a uniform point or symbol 
on a map (Bowen et al. 1995; Pulido 2000; Downey 
2003; Maantay 2002; Mennis 2002; Pastor et al. 
2004; and Campbell and Peck 2010). 
Our web application’s cartography avoids this 
limitation with symbols that change color and size. In 
the two maps on the previous page, a viewer could 
discern that while the St. Louis MSA was 
deindustrializing between 1996 and 2007, a 
significant cluster of facilities with higher volumes and 
more risk remained near East St. Louis. An interested 
viewer could then zoom in to one or two concentrated 
risk clusters and focus their attention on a much 
smaller portion of the riskscape.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Since the migration of the Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI) from paper reports and compact disks 
in 1987 to the internet, numerous mapping tools have 
been developed. The TRI Performance Explorer web-
map joins this crowded field with several important 
advantages. Our tool blends the democratizing 
access of the internet while maintaining the 
rationalizing features of a symbology informed by 
peer-reviewed scholarship, expert cartography, and 
extensive metadata.  
In their assessment of the TRI, Kraft et al. (2011) 
described several prescriptions for the next 
generation of environmental information disclosure. 
“The [EPA] could make it easy for users to find 
pertinent information. . . via an interactive map of 
facility locations, releases, and risks” (188) and our 
effort here offers one prototype. They also 
recommended that TRI data should be presented in a 
way that facilitates the analysis of performance over 
time.  The symbols in our current web map for a TRI 
facility change in color and size to depict increases or 
decreases of environmental performance. This design 
allows a user to ascertain whether the facilities they 
are viewing are getting safer and cleaner, or riskier 
and dirtier with the addition of a time-slider. Individual 
facilities are also easily comparable in the viewing 
area. Moreover, users can select individual facilities 
and obtain more information on the specific amount of 
pollution volume and risk quantification derived with 
the RSEI program.  
This design, we believe, offers a more practical 
resolution of facility-level variations and supports 
another important policy prescription from Kraft et al. 
(2011).  
“The appropriate strategy at both the federal level 
is to target those facilities and firms that need greater 
incentives or technical assistance to reduce releases 
and risks while simultaneously encouraging, 
recognizing, and rewarding those facilities and firms 
that are steadily improving their environmental 
performance” (194). 
Leading and lagging facility performance is 
quickly discernible with the use of our web map’s time 
slider.  
We also, as Kraft et al. (2011) cautioned, 
recognize the potential pitfalls of easier and wider 
access to complicated risk and industrial output 
measures in a web map. “The downside of easily 
accessible environmental information, according to 
Kraft et al. (2011), is that riskscape geographies may 
“. . . be incorrect or subject to misinterpretation, 
leading to unfounded public fears and inappropriate 
actions” (187). One standard concern is that any map 
projection or facility characterization is a very limited 
view of reality and poses significant problems for 
decision making. We would argue that the pros and 
cons of incomplete information are a bit more 
complex. 
On the one hand, it’s true that information used to 
mislead, manipulate, or obscure true conditions on 
the ground can lead to faulty reasoning and therefore 
bad decision making. On the other hand, incomplete 
information based on good intentions and in properly 
managed contexts has the ability to motivate better 
information, which in turn can mean good information 
that leads to, or adds transparency to solid reasoning, 
good decision making, and a strong alignment 
between values and behavior.  
Certainly policy actors want good information and 
while there are other actors, with the best intentions in 
mind, who would argue against faulty information 
being used to drive policy action; incomplete or “bad” 
information is better than no information. Many level 
just such a critique at the TRI and its self-reported 
nature that is used for estimating the surrogate 
inhalation doses driving RSEI’s risk characterization. 
Our argument instead is that contested information, 
properly mediated, opens a window for deliberative 
processes that will lead to increasing the quality of 
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information and fostering collective rationality. In fact, 
this is why we have advanced our effort as a kind of 
”civic cartography.” 
Does our mapping tool rest on assumptions that 
some may understand as faulty? Certainly. Does it 
draw the journalist’s, analyst’s, or activist’s attention 
to the “wrong” conclusions? Quite possibly. But at its 
heart, we have created the mapping tool not as a be 
all, end all; but as a tool that may foster a broader 
conversation and motivate a rethinking of some basic 
premises we find to be faulty, e.g., how focusing on 
releases only and ignoring risk can be very 
misleading.  
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